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The Growth of 
White-Collar Unionism 
and Public Policy in Canada 
George Sayers Bain 
The number of white-collar workers is rapidly increasing. 
If the trade union movement is to continue to play an effective 
rôle in the industrial relations system, it must recruit thèse workers. 
But so far, outside of the public sector of the economy, there is 
relatively Utile white-collar unionism in Canada. The major 
reason for this is that Canadian public policy on industrial 
relations is not very effective in curbing management opposition 
to white-collar unionism. The paper suggests several ways in 
which public policy might be made not only more effective in 
this regard but also deals with the problems arising from the 
growth of white-collar unionism. 
Introduction 
This paper is based on work done for the Task Force on Labour 
Relations with a view to ascertaining what observations and recom-
mandations it might make regarding white-collar unionism(1). The paper 
would focuses on those aspects of the subject to which public policy 
seem to be most relevant : the growth of white-collar unionism and the 
problems arising therefrom. There was not time in the four weeks available 
for preparing this paper to undertake any new basic research. It was only 
possible to draw upon the studies 
already done in this area for the BAIN, George Sayers Research Fel-low, Nuffield Collège, Oxford, En-
gland. 
0) The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Task Force on Labour Relations or any of its members. 
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Task Force, <2) the author's own research in Great Britain, <3> and the work 
of other scholars in North America and elsewhere. <4> 
Perhaps it is best to make clear at the outset an assumption which 
underlies much of the reasoning in this paper, namely that it is désirable 
for employées, both manual and white-collar, <5> to belong to trade 
unions. (6> There is not room hère to offer a detailed justification for 
this assumption, but only to indicate the gênerai considération upon which 
it is based. 
Basically, the legitimacy and justification of trade unions rests upon 
a befief in the value of démocratie decision-making. Regardless of how 
generous, fair-minded, or accessible to his employées an employer may 
be, he will not always be able to make décisions which are in their best 
(2) In addition to the présent paper, the Task Force commissioned five studies in 
this area : Frances Bairstow, « White-Collar Workers and Collective Bargaining » ; 
Shirley B. Goldenberg, «Professional Workers and Collective Bargaining»; J. 
Douglas Muir, « Industry Study-Teachers » ; Robert Rogow, « Supervïsors and 
Collective Bargaining »; and C. Gordon Simmons, « Collective Bargaining at the 
Municipal Government Level in Canada ». (Page références to thèse papers are not 
given because they will not coincide with the printed text when published. Ed.) 
(3) Trade Union Growth and Récognition (London : HMSO, Royal Commission 
on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, Research Paper No. 6, 1967) ; 
The Growth of White-Collar Unionism, to be published in the autumn of 1969 
by Oxford University Press ; and with David Coates and Valérie Ellis a forth-
coming study, Class, Status and White-Collar Unionism. 
(4) There is a vast literature on white-collar unionism. For some of this see G.S. 
Bain and Harold Pollins « T h e History of White-Collar Unions and Industrial 
Relations : A Bibliography », Labour History, N°. 11 (Autumn, 1965), pp. 20-65, 
and Bibliography on Non-Manual Workers (Geneva : ILO, 1959). Two récent 
sources are « Professional and White-Collar Unionism : An International Compar-
ison, Industrial Relations, V (October, 1965), pp. 37-150, and Adolf Sturmthal, 
editor, White-Collar Trade Unions (Urbana : University of Illinois Press, 1966). 
(5) In this paper the concept of the white-collar labour force is used in its widest con-
text, and the following broad occupational catégories hâve been taken as composing 
the white-collar group : managers and administrators ; foremen and supervisors ; 
professionals ; scientists, technologists, and technicians ; specially « créative » 
occupations such as artists, musicians, and entertainers ; clérical and administrative 
workers ; salesmen, commercial travellers, and shop assistante ; and security 
personnel. 
(6) The word « trade union » is used in a generic sensé throughout this paper to 
refer to any organisation of employées which participâtes in the process of job 
régulation either unilaterally or jointly (that is, by bargaining with employers). 
See Allan Flanders, Industrial Relations : What Is Wrong With The System ? 
(London : Faber, 1965), chaps. 2 and 3 for a discussion of the various forms of 
job régulation. 
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interests. The claimants upon the considération of the employer-manager 
include not only the enterprise's employées, but also its suppliers of raw 
materials, its customers, its shareholders, and the Government. The 
employer-manager cannot govern entirely in the interests of any one of 
thèse groups, but must balance the claims of them ail in such a way that 
the enterprise remains economically viable. For, as Peter Drucker has 
pointed out, the 
main function and purpose of the enterprise is the production of 
goods, not the governance of men. Its governmental authority over 
men must always be subordinated to its économie performance and 
responsibility . . . Hence it can never be discharged primarily in the 
interests of those over whom the enterprise rules. C7) 
Thus the very nature of the employer-manager's function will sometimes 
require him to act against the interests of his employées as they see them. 
On such occasions, employées require a trade union to présent their views 
in a cohérent form and to provide the countervailing power necessary 
to ensure that thèse views are fuïïy considered by the employer-manager. 
Trade unions are necessary to ensure that employées hâve an effective 
voice in decision-making not only within the firm but also within the 
larger socïetv. Gunnar Myrdal has observed that Western societies are 
becoming « organisation societies » in which the only way an individual 
can effectively participate in national decision-making is through group 
représentation. (8> Décisions on économie and social matters are increasingly 
being taken or at least influenced by bodies such as the National Economie 
Development Council and the National Board for Priées and Incomes 
in Britain, the President's Labor Management Policy Committee in the 
United States, and the Economie Council in Canada. It is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, for an employée to be represented on thèse 
bodies or even to appear, before them in an attempt to influence their 
policies, except through the médium of a trade union. 
Given that démocratie decision-making is a good thing, it follows 
that lack of unîonisation among large numbers of white-collar (and 
manual) workers is a matter for serious concern. <9> For as long as groups 
of employées are unrepresented in decision-making both inside and out-
side the firm, the process and structure of democracy is less complète. 
O The New Society (London : Heineman, 1951), p. 81 (italics not in the original). 
(8) Beyond The Welfare State (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1960), 
pp. 43-46. 
(9) Much of the analysis in this paper applies to both white-collar and manual 
unionism. But, in view of the paper's terms of référence, the analysis is set forth 
in terms of white-collar unionism only. 
246 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 24, NO 2 
The question therefore arises as to how the growth of unionism among 
thèse workers can best be encouraged. But before this question can be 
answered, it is first necessary to isolate the major factors which promote 
or hinder the growth of white-collar unionism. 
Factors Affecting the Growth of 
White-Collar Unionism 
There are numerous factors which might affect the growth of 
unionism among white-collar workers. Thèse include : (a) such socio-
demographic characteristics of white-collar workers as their sex, social 
origins, âge, and status in the community ; (b) such aspects of their 
économie position as earnings, fringe benefits, and employment security ; 
(c) such aspects of their work situation as the degree of employment 
concentration, the opportunities for promotion, the extent of mechanization 
and automation, and the degree of proximity to unionised manual workers ; 
(d) such aspects of trade unions as their public image, recruitmenl: policies, 
and structures ; (e) the degree to which employers are prepared to 
recognize unions representing white-collar employées ; and (f ) the extent 
of government action which promotes union récognition. 
Limitations of time and space make it impossible to examine the 
relationship between each of thèse factors and the growth of white-collar 
unionism. <10> But it is possible hère to discuss briefly three of thèse 
factors which research and expérience in several countries indicate are 
of overwhelming stratégie importance. Thèse areiithe extent to which the 
employment of white-collar workers is concentrated în large groups the 
degree to wHich employers are prepared to recoghise unions representing 
white-collar employées, and the extent of government action which 
promotes union récognition. 
There are several reasons why the degree of unionisation is likely 
to be higher among larger rather than smaller groups of employées. To 
begin with, the larger the number of employées in a group the more 
necessary it becomes to administer them in a « bureaucratie » fashion. 
In the présent context, the essential feature of bureaucratie administration 
« is its emphasis on the office rather than upon the individu al office-
holder ».(11) This means that employées are treated not as individuals 
but as members of catégories or groups. Their terms and conditions of 
(10) The author has done this for Britain in The Growth of White-Collar Unionism, 
op.cit. 
(") R.M. Blackburn and K. Prandy, « White-Collar Unionization : A Conceptual 
Framework», British Journal of Sociology, XVI (lune, 1965), p. 117. 
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employment as well as their promotion prospects are determined not by 
the personal considérations and sentiments of their managers, but by 
formai rules which apply impersonally to ail members of the group to 
which they belong. <12> The resuit is that the group's working conditions 
tend to become standardised. (13> 
« Bureaucratisation » is the administrative answer to the problem 
of governing large numbers of employées. It makes for administrative 
efficiency in a business. But it is also likely to assist the growth of unionism. 
For, as Dubin has argued, making the rule for the work group rather 
than the individual worker is likely to affect him in the following ways : 
He becomes aware of his personal inability to make an individual 
« deal » for himself outside the company rules and procédures, except 
under the circumstances of a « lucky break ». He tends also to view 
himself as part of a group of similarly situated fellow-employees who 
are defined by the rules as being like each other. In addition, uniform 
rule-making and administration of the rules make unionism easier and, 
in a sensé, inévitable. It should be reasonably clear that collective 
bargaining is joint rule-making. It is no great step to the joint déter-
mination by union and management of rules governing employment 
from the détermination of them by management alone. Both proceed 
from the basic assumption that generally applicable rules are necessary 
to govern the relations between men in the plant. Once a worker accepts 
the need for gênerai rules covering his own conduct, he is equally 
likely to consider the possibility of modifying the existing ones in his 
favor rather than to seek their total abolishment.(14) 
Since the rules apply to him as a member of a group rather than as an 
individual, the most effective way of modifying them in his favour is by 
collective rather than individual bargaining. 
(12) Bureaucratisation may also lead to a blockage of promotion prospects. With 
the bureaucratie emphasis on technical competency and formai qualifications, there 
may be direct recruting to managerial positions from outside the organisation. In 
addition, the économies of administrative rationalisation may resuit in a réduction 
in the ratio of managerial to clérical functions. 
(13) The terms « bureaucratie administration » and « bureaucratisation » hâve 
acquired a number of meanings in sociological writings. For a discussion of thèse 
see Richard H. Hall, « The Concept of Bureaucracy : An Empirical Assessment », 
American Journal of Sociology, LXIX (July, 1963), pp. 32-40, and C.R. Hinings, 
et al, « An Approach to the Study of Bureaucracy », Sociology, I (January, 1967), 
pp. 61-72. It is important to note that thèse terms are used in a very restricted sensé 
throughout this paper to refer simply to a method of administering the labour force. 
(") Robert Dubin, « Decision-Making by Management in Industrial Relations », 
Reader in Bureaucracy, Robert K. Merton et al, editors (Glencoe 111. : The Free 
Press, 1952), p.234. 
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But the greater degree of bureaucratisation associated with larger 
groups of employées is not the only reason they are likely to be more 
highly unionised. Another reason is that trade unions tend to concentrate 
their recruiting efforts on such groups. It is fairly obvious why they 
should do this. Larger groups of employées are probably more favourably 
disposed towards trade unionism because of the bureaucratie manner in 
which they are governed on the job, and they are therefore likely to be 
easier to recruit. They are also likely to be less expensive to recruit. 
Trade union recruiting is characterised by économies of scale : in gênerai, 
the larger the group recruited the lower the per capita costs. Similarly, 
larger groups of members are less expensive for unions to administer : 
the larger the group the greater the probability that one or two of its 
members will possess the qualities required for leadership at the rank-
and-file level, and the easier it is to police the collective agreement and 
ensure that its provisions are observed. Moreover, collective agreements 
covering large groups of employées hâve a greater impact on the gênerai 
level of salaries and conditions than a whole séries of agreements covering 
small groups. Finally, the more members a union recruits the more power 
it is able to wield in negotiations with employers as well as within the 
labour movement. 
This a priori reasoning tends to be supported by empirical évidence. 
In Britain, Lockwood has shown that the extent to which white-collar 
workers are unionised in national government, local government, banking, 
and private industry is partly determined by the extent to which their 
work situation is bureaucratised.(15) Blackburn and Prandy found that 
the degree of unionisation in individual banks is partly accounted for 
by the extent to which their size forces them to administer their employées 
in a bureaucratie manner.(16) The présent author found that a considérable 
amount of the variation in the occupational and industrial pattern of 
manufacturing white-collar unionism in Britain can be explained by 
variations in the degree of employment concentration. <17> In the United 
States, studies by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, <18> Cleland, <19> Meyers, <?°> 
(15) David Lockwood, The Blackcoated Worker (London : Allen and Unwïn, 1958), 
especially pp. 141-150. 
(16) Op. cit., p. 118, n. 17. 
(17) The Growth of White-Collar Unionism, op.cit., chap. 6. 
(18) «Extent of Collective Agreements in 17 Labor Markets, 1953-54», Monthly 
Labor Review, LXXVIII (January, 1955), p. 67. 
(19) Sherrill Cleland, The Influence of Plant Size on Industrial Relations (Prince-
ton, NJ . : Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, 1955), pp. 14-21. 
(20) Frédéric Meyers, « T h e Growth of Collective Bargaining in Texas — A Newly 
Industrialized Area» , Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 
IX (December, 1956), p. 286. 
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and SteeÏQ and Mclntyre (n) hâve demonstrated a strong positive relation-
ship between the size of establishment and the extent to which they are 
unionised. Studies in Norway, ^2> Sweden, <23) Austria, (24> and Japan <**> 
hâve shown that the level of unionism is higher in larger that in smaller 
offices. In reviewing the extent and nature of white-collar unionism in 
eight countries, Sturmthal found that its density is generally higher in 
the public than in the private sector of the economy, and concluded that 
this is primarly because public employées tend to be concentrated in large 
groups which are administered in a bureaucratie fashion. <26> Bairstow 
has also offered this as a partial explanation for the fact that government 
white-collar employées are more highly unionized in Canada that private 
white-collar workers. <27> 
But while the degree of employment concentration is very important 
in accounting for the growth of white-collar unionism, it is by no means 
the whole story. The attitudes and behaviour of employers towards white-
collar unions are also important. The more willing employers are to 
recognise white-collar unions and the greater the degree of récognition <28> 
which they are prepared to confer upon them, the greater the growth of 
thèse unions is likely to be. 
The explanation of this is threefold. First, workers, especially white-
collar workers, tend to identify with management, and they are, therefore, 
(21) H. Ellsworth Steele and Sherwood C. Mclntyre, «Company Structure and 
Unionization », The Journal of the Alabama Academy of Science, (January, 1959), 
p. 38. 
(22) Egil Fivelsdal, « White-Collar Unions and the Norwegian Labor Movement », 
lndustrial Relations, V (October, 1965), p. 85, n.7. 
(23) Arne H. Nilstein, « White-Collar Unionism in Sweden », White-Collar Trade 
Unions, Adolf Sturmthal, editor (Urbana : University of Illinois Press, 1966), 
pp. 275-276. 
(-4) Ernst Lakenbacker, «White-Collar Unions in Austria», ibid., p. 53. 
(25) Solomon B. Levine, « Unionization of White-Collar Employées in Japan », 
ibid., pp. 222-223. 
(26) Ibid., pp. 379-380. 
(27) Op. cit. 
(28)It is often assumed that a union either possesses récognition or it does not. But, 
in reality, union récognition is a matter of degree. On the one extrême, the employer 
may oppose the union by force or by « peaceful compétition » and there is little 
or no récognition. On the other extrême, the employer may bargain with the union 
on any matter it may wish to raise ; meet any représentatives that the union may 
appoint ; accord the union the necessary facilities to collect dues, hold meetings, 
and publicise its activities ; encourage his employées to join the union ; and provide 
it with essential information for collective bargaining. Between thèse two extrêmes, 
there are many intermediate positions. 
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less likely to join trade unions the more strongly management disapproves 
of them. Second, the more strongly management disapproves of trade 
unions, the less likely workers are to join them in case they jeopardise 
their career prospects. Third and most important, unions are usually 
accepted on instrumental rather than ideological grounds, « as something 
to be used rather than as something in which to believe ».(2f) Many 
employées want to see « the proof of the pudding » before they join a 
union but « the proof of the pudding cornes once the union has been 
recognised ».(30) The less récognition an employer is prepared to give a 
union, the more difficult it is for the union to participate in the process of 
job régulation and thereby demonstrate to employées that it can provide 
a service for them. In such circumstances, not only are a large number 
of employées not likely to join the union, but many of those who hâve 
already done so are likely to let their membership lapse because the 
return they are getting on it is insufficient. 
There is a considérable body of évidence in several countries which 
supports the argument that récognition is important in fostering union 
growth. In Britain, studies of white-collar unionism in mining, (31> 
banking,(32) and retail distribution <3> ail attest to mis fact. So does the 
work of the présent author. It is not possible to présent the supporting 
évidence hère, but it very strongly indicates that, in addition to the 
degree of employment concentration, the major factor accounting for 
the variations in the occupational and industrial pattern of white-collar 
unionism in Britain are variations in the degree to which employers hâve 
recognised this unionism. (34> At least one reason for the relatively high 
level of white-collar unionism in the American postal service and the 
railway industry is that the Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912 and the Railway 
Labor Act of 1926 respectively gave white-collar employées in thèse 
areas the right to join unions and the unions the right to engage in collec-
(29) C. Wright Mills, White Collar (New York : Oxford University Press, 1956), 
p.308. 
(30) Reply of Allan Flanders to Q. 10,005, Minutes of Evidence 62 of the Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations (London : HMSO, 1967). 
(31) Brian McCormick, « Managerial Unionism in the Coal Industry », British 
Journal of Sociology, XI (December, 1960), p. 367. 
(32) R.M. Blackburn, Union Character and Social Class (London : Batsford, 1967), 
especially pp. 249-251. 
(33) Robert E.L. Knight, « Unionism Among Retail Clerks in Postwar Britain », 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XIV (July, 1961), pp. 522-523. 
(34) Trade Union Growth and Récognition, op. cit., chap. 5, and The Growth of 
White-Collar Unionism, op. cit., chap. 8. 
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tive bargaining. ^ The various contributors to Sturmthal's book also 
make it clear that the generally higher level of white-collar unionism in 
the public sector of the économies of various nations is partly explained 
by the greater willingness of public employers to recognise this union-
ism. (36) The Public Service Staff Relations Act in Canada and Executive 
Order 10,988 in the United States are the most récent examples of this 
tendency. Goldenberg feels that « the 'quiet révolution' in Québec, which 
not only established collective bargaining rights for professional employées 
(Labour Code 1964) but seemed to encourage their organisation, par-
ticularly in the public sector » at least partially accounts for the « unique 
success in the unionization of professional workers » in this area. (37> 
The impact of employer attitudes and behaviour upon the growth of 
white-collar unionism is brought out even more clearly by the expérience 
of supervisory unionism in North America. Dale and Raimon hâve argued 
that the fact that an estimated 80 per cent of supervisory and managerial 
employées on American railways are unionised is almost entirely attribut-
able to the collective bargaining provisions of the various Railway Labor 
Acts. <88) Evidence presented in Rogow's paper indicates that the major 
factor explaining the décline of supervisory unionism in the United States 
after World War II was the « préventive programs » devised by manage-
ment and made possible largely by the removal of légal protection for 
supervisory unionism. (39> 
Différences in the ease with which unions can obtain récognition is 
also important in explaining différences in the degree of white-collar union-
ism between North America and Europe. Kassalow has argued that 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, the obtaining of union 
récognition is a highly legalistic and formai matter. For the most part, 
récognition rights must be won employer by employer, and each case 
may call for a spécial organizing campaign. And as white-collar 
employée units tend to be relatively small (especially in private ma-
nufacturing industry), this makes organization slow and costly. 
The central rôle of employer associations in European industrial 
relations makes white-collar organizing easier under an association 
pattern of bargaining, the union does not hâve to « prove » majority 
(35) See Kassalow, op. cit., pp. 329-330, 334-335, and 341. 
(36) Op.cit. 
<37) Op. cit. 
(38) Ernest Dale and Robert Raimon, « Management Unionism and Public Policy on 
the Railroads and the Airlines », Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XI (July, 
1958), pp. 551-571. 
(39) Op. cit. 
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représentation at any given plant. The employers ' association usually 
bargains and signs agreements for ail its members. Union campaigns 
need not be waged company by company. When récognition is won 
from the association, the white-collar union generally is automatically 
recognized for ail affiliated firms. 
The more formai, less legalistic European method of wining union 
récognition also makes the union less vulnérable to later loss of récogn-
ition. In the United States, for example, concerted individual campaigns 
by several electronics companies and aircraft companies succeeded 
in knocking out engineering union majorities through decertification 
élections. (40) 
The évidence which the présent author has gathered for Britain strongly 
supports Kassalow's argument. It demonstrates that in almost every 
instance employers' associations granted récognition to white-collar unions 
long before they had sufficient strength to force the employers to do so, 
and generally even before the unions represented a substantial proportion, 
let alone a majority, of the employées concerned. (41> 
The importance of the third stratégie factor in the process of white-
collar union growth — government policy with regard to union récognition 
— has already been made clear to some extent in the preceding discussion. 
Where governments in their rôle as employer hâve adopted more favour-
able policies towards the unionisation of their employées, this has always 
been followed by a dramatic increase in the growth of unionism among 
them. American postal unionism and the Lloyd-La Follette Act, American 
fédéral civil service unionism and Executive Order 10,988, and Canadian 
fédéral civil service unionism and the Public Service Staff Relations Act 
provide examples on this continent. Foreign examples can be found in 
the civil services and nationalised industries of Britain, ^ Sweden, <48> 
France,(44) Austria,<45> and other European countries. 
(40) Everett M. Kassalow, « The Prospects for White-Collar Union Growth », 
Industrial Relations, V (October, 1965) , pp. 41-42. 
(41) Trade Union Growth and Récognition, op.cit., chap.4. See also Knight, loc.cit. 
C42) O. Kahn-Freund, « Légal Framework », The System of Industrial Relations in 
Great Britain, Allan Flanders, and H.A. Clegg, editors (Oxford : Blackwell, 1954) , 
p.54, and B.V. Humphreys, Clérical Unions in the Civil Service (Oxford : Black-
well, 1958) . 
(43) Nilstein, op.cit., pp. 270-271. 
C44) Michel Crozier, « White-Collar Unions — The Case of France » in Sturmthal, 
op.cit., p . 115. 
C45) Lakenbacher, op.cit., pp. 58-59 and 67. 
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Government policies, by tending to neutralise or at least contain the 
attitudes and behaviour of employers towards trade unions, hâve also 
had a profound effect upon the growth of unionism in the private sector 
of the economy. The Railway Labor Act and the Wagner Act in the 
United States as well as P.C. 1003 in Canada testify to this. It is also 
noticeable that the degree of white-collar unionism is highest by a considér-
able margin in the two Canadian provinces — Saskatchewan and Québec 
— which hâve législation the most favourable to it.(46) There is not room 
hère to give the supporting évidence, but Rogow <47> and Ross (48) make it 
clear that fluctuations in the membership of the Foreman's Association 
of America between its birth in the late 1930's and the passage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 are almost perfectly correlated with fluctuations 
in the rulings of the NLRB as to whether or not foremen were covered by 
the provisions of the Wagner Act. Most students of the FAA are also 
agreed that its décline after 1947 can be almost wholly attributed to the 
provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act which relieved employers of their 
obligation to recognise and bargain in good faith with foremen's unions 
and to refrain from engaging in unfair labour practices against them. (49> 
Nilstein and Johnston point out that the high level of white-collar unionism 
in the private sector in Sweden (50 per cent) is very largely a product 
of the Rights of Association and Negotiation Act of 1936 which broke 
employer résistance to organisation among white-collar workers. (50> Even 
in the voluntaristic environment of the British industrial relations System, 
a great deal of white-collar union récognition and growth in private indus-
try can be attributed to government policies necessitated by war which 
made it easier for unions to exert pressure for récognition and harder for 
employers to resist it.(51) In fact, the Donovan Commission has recently 
corne to the conclusion that if the amount of white-collar unionism in 
private industry in Britain is to be increased significantly, further govern-
ment action to encourage trade union récognition will be required, and it 
(46) Bairstow, op.cit. 
(47) Op.cit. 
(48) Philip Ross, The Government as a Source of Union Power (Providence, R.I. : 
Brown University Press, 1965), pp. 260-262. 
(49) Rogow, op.cit; Charles P. Larrowe, « A Meteor on the Industrial Relations 
Horizon : The Foreman's Association of America», Labor History, II (Fall, 1961), 
p.294; David Levinson, « Wartime Unionization of Foremen » (unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1949), p. 437. 
(50) Niistein, op.cit., p.270, and T.L. Johnston, Collective Bargaining In Sweden 
(Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1962), p.94. 
(51) See Trade Union Growth and Récognition, op.cit., chap.4. 
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has recommended the establishment of an Industrial Relations Commission 
to deal, among other things, with récognition disputes.(52) 
This section of the paper has tried to indicate the major factors which 
affect the growth of white-collar unionism — the degree of employment 
concentration, the degree of union récognition, and the extent to which 
public policy promotes union récognition. The greater the degree of 
employment concentration the greater the density of white-collar unionism. 
The explanation for this would seem to be that employées are more likely 
to realise the need for trade unionism and trade unions are more likely 
to be interested in recruiting them, the more concentrated their employ-
ment. But this particular need may not be met because employers refuse 
to recognise unions and pursue policies designed to discourage or prohibit 
their white-collar employées from joining them. Unions, especially in 
North America, hâve generally been unable by themselves to force employ-
ers to concède récognition. This has also required the introduction of 
government policies which hâve made it easier for unions to exert pressure 
for récognition and harder for employers to resist it. It is not claimed 
that thèse are the only factors affecting the growth of white-collar unionism, 
but only those which research in severai countries suggests are of 
overwhelming stratégie importance. 
The Encouragement of White-Collar 
Unionism by Public Policy 
Now that the major déterminants of the growth of white-collar 
unionism hâve been indicated, an attempt can be made to answer the 
question of how it can best be encouraged. The preceding discussion has 
demonstrated that even where employment concentration créâtes a need 
for white-collar unionism, it is unlikely to grow significantly unless man-
agement opposition is effectively curbed by public policy. It is this paper's 
contention that although public policy in Canada claims to do this, it 
does not. To demonstrate this conclusively, it would be necessary to under-
take a comprehensive survey of employer policies and practices with 
regard to the récognition of white-collar unions. Unfortunately, this has 
not been done for the Task Force, and there is not sufficient time avail-
able to do this now. <53) 
(52) Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations (London : 
HMSO, 1968), pp. 61-65. 
(53) The author has done this for Britain in The Growth of White-Collar Unionism, 
op.cit., chap.8. 
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But at least some évidence for the contention that Canadian public 
policy is ineffective in curbing management opposition to white-collar 
unionism is contained in Bairstow's paper.(54) Five of the ten companies 
which she approached refused to allow her to interview their white-collar 
employées regarding trade unionism. It is worth quoting at some length 
from the reply of one of thèse companies to Bairstow's request : 
. . . [our] management has never actively opposed union organizational 
efforts among manual production employées.... On the other hand, 
we hâve actively opposed organization of salaried office employées. 
The company has, consistently with applicable législation and régul-
ations, actively opposed the union organization of our office people. 
The UAW has made several attempts to organize our office employées 
in Thèse were were ail full blown organization campaigns. 
(They hâve also made halting attempts in .) Our response 
was to mount an active program « to communicate management views 
on industrial relations issues ». This involved letters to employées and 
a séries of a meetings with employées. We used visual aids, discussion 
groups — the lot. (One of the admirable features of the U.S. industrial 
relations System is the freedom of such communication accorded man-
agement.) I am glad to say that, so far, we hâve successfully and 
overwhelmingly defeated the union in its organization drive. 
It is our intention to continue this approach. We shall continue 
to do everything that is possible within the law to persuade our salaried 
employées to our conviction that their unionization serves neither 
their interests nor those of the company. 
Even some of the companies which allowed Bairstow to interview 
their white-collar employées admitted to discouraging them from joining 
trade unions. One manager informed her : 
Fil do everything I can to stop my office employées from unionizing. 
Whenever I hear of a union coming around hère, I call ail my emplo-
yées in and tell them what I think of unions and why they don't need 
one. No union has ever got a toe in the door hère. As long as I 
am a manager, no union ever will. 
A manager in another firm was less subtle : 
Of course, we don't let a fired employée know that we fired him 
for union activity. If we want to fire him for that, we watch him 
until he slips up and then get him for coming in late or smoking in a 
« no smoking » area, or something. We can always find something. 
The fact that thèse and no doubt many other Canadian companies are 
able actively and successfully to oppose the unionisation of their white-
i54) Op.cit 
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collar employées and still stay within the limits of the law suggests that 
Canadian public policy is not very effective in curbing management oppo-
sition to unionism. 
There are several ways in which Canadian public policy might be 
made more effective in this regard. In surveying « informed opinion » 
regarding public policy on industrial relations in Canada for the Task 
Force, Christie could find no gênerai agreement that one purpose of this 
policy vvas the encouragement of union organisation. ^ Perhaps this is 
not surprising since this purpose is not explicitly stated in any Canadian 
législation. Any improvement in Canadian public policy on industrial 
relations might therefore begin with a clear statement of the value of 
trade unionism and the collective bargaining which it makes possible, and 
of the desirability of encouraging the growth of thèse institutions by means 
of public policy. Such a statement would be useful in setting the tone for 
industrial relations in Canada. More important, « informed opinion » 
believes that the effectiveness of industrial relations public policy is very 
largely a matter of the approach of the administering board,(56) and such 
a statement should remove from the minds of those who administer this 
policy any uncertainty as to what its purpose is. (57) 
But this improvement would not be sufficient by itself to bring about 
a significant expansion of unionism among white-coUar workers. The major 
criterion that Labour Relations Boards take into considération in grant-
ing récognition to a union is whether it is représentative of the employées 
concerned, that is whether a majority of them are members of the union. 
The discussion of the factors affecting the growth of white-collar unionism 
made it clear that representativeness and récognition are not independent 
phenomena, but are closely related and interact. In short, the one reinforces 
the other. Thus regardless of how judiciously the criterion of representativ-
eness is applied, it will always work to the disadvantage of the union, for 
the absence of récognition is itself one of the major factors impeding the 
growth of union membership. This is not an argument for completely 
abandoning this criterion and for granting récognition to a union before 
it has any representativeness whatsoever. But it is an argument for giving 
the union a better chance of becoming représentative. 
(55) Innis Christie, « An Exploratory Study of the Efficacy of the Law of Unfair 
Labour Practices in Canada ». 
(56) Ibid. 
(57) Of course, other purposes of Canadian industrial relations législation such as 
the promotion of industrial peace could also be explicitly stated. 
THE GROWTH OF WHITE-COLLAR UNIONISM AND PUBLIC POLICY . . . 257 
There are several ways in which this might be accomplished. First, 
rather than require a union to demonstrate that it has a majority among 
ail those employed in a bargaining unit, it could be required to demonstrate 
that it has a majority only among those actually voting. At the moment, 
in ail jurisdictions except Nova Scotia, ail the employées in a unit who do 
not vote are assumed not to want the union. There seems to be no good 
reason for this assumption, especially since, as was argued above, the 
criterion of representativeness already places the union at a disadvantage. 
Second, given the interdependence between union membership and 
récognition, it seems unfair that unions should be required to demonstrate 
such a high level of membership before being allowed a représentation 
vote. For example, in Ontario a union must be able to demonstrate 45 
per cent and in Manitoba 50 per cent membership before such a vote 
is allowed. Christie found that there was a substantial body of opinion 
drawn from both sides of industry as well as from the uncommitted experts 
and administrators favouring a « quick vote » procédure which would 
entitle the union to a vote on every certification application upon a prima 
facie showing that it could command the support of, say, thirty per cent 
of the bargaining unit. (58> 
Third, the récognition process could be speeded-up. The longer it 
takes a union to obtain récognition the more likely members are to lapse, 
partly because they feel the union is not obtaining any concrète results 
and partly because of high labour turnover in many areas of white-collar 
employment. Both Bairstow and Christie hâve found some évidence which 
suggests that delay through over-concern with technicalities and over-use 
of any légal proceedings available is the principal way in which manage-
ment abuses existing labour relations législation. (59> The most obvious 
way to solve this problem would be to make the existing législation much 
less technical and legalistic. For example, there seems to be no reason 
(except that it gives employers a number of grounds upon which to 
oppose the certification of a union) for requiring a union to demonstrate 
that a majority of employées in a unit are « members in good standing » 
and defining this in an extremely technical and legalistic manner. What 
is important is not whether a majority of the employées are « legally » 
members of the union but whether they wish the union to represent them. 
The wishes of the employées could be more easily and accurately 
determined by simply requiring them to pétition the Board that they 
(58) Op.cit. 
(59) Bairstow, op. cit., and Christ ie , op. cit. 
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wish to be represented by a certain union.(60) No doubt those who are 
more familiar with the opération of Canadian industrial relations législation 
could think of several other ways in which it might be simplifiée and the 
opportunités for légal proceedings reduced. 
Fourth, a union would hâve a better chance of becoming représentative 
if it had the same advantages as an employer in communicating with 
employées. An American labour lawyer has noted that 
In an organizing drive, the advantages of communication are markedly 
with management. Labor has to rely pretty much on appeals via esta-
blished média of communication, circulars distributed at the place of 
the employer, home solicitations, and meetings at a bired hall. Man-
agement has available to it a complète and accurate mailing list of 
employées, together with the plant itself, wherein employées can be 
addressed as a captive audience, or on their own time. Furthermore, 
during working hours other than for relief and rest periods, manage-
ment contacts with employées are more fréquent and more sustained. 
This is a matter about which one could comment at length.C61) 
In order to help the union overcome this inhérent disadvantage, public 
policy might ensure that as much as possible the union is given an equal 
opportunity to communicate with employées. Thus if an employer addresses 
his employées regarding unionisation on company time and property, he 
could be required to make the same facilities available to the union. Or, 
if he communicates by mail with his employées regarding unionisation, 
he could be required to make the mailing list available to the union. 
Other examples could be given. 
The changes described above would certainly give a union a better 
chance of demonstrating its representativeness. But they would do little 
or nothing to curb employer opposition to unions. One way in which 
public policy could be made more effective in this regard would be by 
removing an employer's right to appear before the Board in opposition 
to an application for certification. It is obviously of some conséquence 
to an employer whether a union is certified to represent his employées 
and which union this is to be. But it does not follow that he has a right 
to hâve a say in this matter. The employées' choice of a union is similar 
to an individual's choice of a lawyer. It is obviously of some interest and 
concern to the plaintiff who, if anyone, will represent the défendant, but 
(60) If 30 per cent of them did this, then this could be taken as the prima facie 
évidence for holding a « quick vote » as was described above. 
(61) Robert J. Doolan, « Attitudes of White-Collar Workers Towards Unionization », 
Addresses on Industrial Relations (Ann Arbor : University of Michigan, Bureau 
of Industrial Relations, 1959), p . l l . 
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there would obviously be a conflict of interest in allowing the plaintiff 
to hâve any say as to who this should be. Similarly, the choice of a union 
is a matter for the employées alone to décide. In any case, the employer's 
appearance before the Board is superfluous, for the Board already 
examines those matters on vvhich employers challenge a union's application 
for certification. In an application for certification, the employer's rôle 
before the Board should be restricted to providing it with a list of his 
employées and his views as to the désirable shape of the bargaining unit. 
There is also a conflict of interest in allowing an employer to make 
or support an application for revocation of a union's certification. It is 
also unnecessary. For if the employées feel so strongly that the incumbent 
union is not representing their best interests, they will presumably make 
their own application for revocation to the Board (perhaps with the help 
of another union). But if it is feît that employée interests in this regard 
require additional protection, then it could be laid down that a union 
would automatically lose its certification, in the first instance, if no 
attempt had been made to negotiate a collective agreement within twelve 
months of certification, and after that, within twelve months of the expiry 
of the last agreement. 
Public policy could also be made more effective in curbing employer 
opposition to unionism by strengthening the provisions concerning em-
ployer unfair labour practices.(62) It is clear from Christie's intérim 
report that many of the unfair labour practices are extremely difficult 
to enforce against « a subtle and well-advised employer » primarily 
because of the difficulty of ascertaining employer motives.(63) This might 
be remedied by placing the omis of proof in unfair labour practice cases 
upon the employer. This has already been done in Québec. In addition, 
the scope for employer unfair labour practices might be reduced by 
prohibiting any unilatéral change in wages and working conditions and 
placing a moratorium on ail firings from the time the employées pétition 
the Board for an élection until it is held. Where this is not already the 
case, the Board rather than the courts could be given the authority to 
prosecute unfair labour practices without the prior approval of the Minister 
of Labour.(64) There may even be a case for giving the Board's field 
officers the power to make binding décisions on unfair labour practices, 
(62) There may also be a case for strengthening the provisions regarding union 
unfair labour pratices, but this subject is outside the scope of this paper. 
(63) Op.cit. 
(64) On this point see ibid. 
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with appeal to the Board, but a more définitive judgment on this question 
will hâve to await Christie's final report.(65) Finally, if the Board convicts 
an employer of an unfair labour practice, one of the penalties might be 
the automatic certification of the union.<66) If an employer is convicted, 
for example, of firing an employée during an organising campaign because 
of his union activity, it may be of some help to this employée to be 
reinstated or compensated. But it is not ail that helpful to the union. 
For the dismissal of this one employée may hâve caused several others 
who would otherwise hâve joined the union not to do so, and thereby 
hâve made it more difficult for the union to demonstrate its represent-
ativeness. 
Many of the suggestions which hâve been made above hâve been 
synthesised into an integrated récognition procédure by Michael Gordon 
in his follow-up study of Section 65 applications.(67) Although it will 
involve a certain amount of répétition, it is worthwhile outlining his plan 
not only because it summarises a great deal of what has already been 
said, but also because it « was put to many individuals from both 
management and labour, almost ail of whom reacted favourably to the 
proposais ».(68) Gordon suggests that the union should be required to 
notify management and the Board of its intention to organise a particular 
plant. At this point there would be an immédiate « freeze » on ail terms 
and conditions of employment; management would be required to provide 
the union with a list of ail employées; and the Board would appoint an 
arbitrator or field officer to act as a référée on any disputes arising out 
of the organising campaign. Both management and the union would 
be given an equal opportunity to address the employées on company time 
and property. Both sides would be limited in what they say only on the 
basis of attempted coercion and intimidation. The company would also 
be required to make time and space available before the vote, for the 
arbitrator or field officer to explain to the employées their rights and 
privilèges and the voting procédure. There would be no necessity for the 
union to demonstrate that a certain proportion of the employées were 
(65) His intérim report suggests that « informed opinion » is generally not in favour 
of this course of action, al though there are some significant exceptions to this. 
(66) The quid pro quo if a union was convicted of an unfair labour practice, might 
be to prohibit it from applying for certification for, say, six months . This seems 
to generally be the position at the moment . 
(67) This study forms Appendix D of Christie, op.cit. 
(68) Ibid, 
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members or supported it before a représentation vote was taken. <69) Such 
a vote would follow automatically after the various addresses had been 
made, with the issue being decided on the basis of a simple majority of 
the ballots cast. 
Even if ail the suggestions advanced in this section of the paper were 
implemented, they might still not be sufficient to bring about a significant 
expansion of unionism among white-collar workers. Christie found that 
Several of the most highly respected people in the field agreed that 
management could, within the ambit of présent législation as enforced, 
« kill » a weak union by refusing to bargain or by engaging in a pre-
tense of bargaining or simply by procrastinating. I t was felt, however, 
that at some point the relationship had to become a test of strength, 
or, alternatively, that a cumbersome légal remedy for failure to bargain 
in good faith would be as time consuming as any management delay-
ing tactic and would therefore equally effectively destroy a weak union. 
Generally, the law was not considered to be particularly effective 
at this stage. (70) 
But there would seem to be at least some ways in which the law could 
be made more effective at the post-certification stage. The employer 
could be encouraged to bargain in good faith by prohibiting any unilatéral 
change in wages and working conditions once the union is certified. In 
addition, during the period when the bargaining relationship is not very 
mature, say the first three to five years following certification, either 
side might be permitted to request the help in negotiations of an in-
dependent arbitrator whose décision would be binding. During this period, 
the union could consolidate its position by showing the employées that 
it could do something for them, and as a resuit of being exposed to 
trade unionism management might corne to view it as something less than 
an unmitigated evil. 
A final way in which trade union growth might be encouraged by 
public policy is by ensuring that everyone is covered by its protective 
(69) Gordon's scheme would not require a union to demonstrate even prima facie 
30 per cent support before holding a représentation vote. This would obviously 
make it even easier for the union to obtain récognition. But it might be argued 
that lack of a « screening device » would lead to a rash of unsuccessful représentation 
votes and place an unbearable administrative burden on Labour Relations Boards. 
Whether or not this would actually be the case, could be better determined by 
those who hâve some practical knowledge of the Boards ' présent workloads. 
(70) Op.cit. 
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provisions. As Rogow has noted 
Coverage by protective législation, or the absence of coverage, strong-
ly affects the fortunes of most employée groups seeking self-organ-
ization. For countries like Canada and the United States exclusion of 
a group from the basic labor laws' définition of « employée » means 
that employers are not under a légal compulsion to bargain, and may 
mean that employer self-help weapons against employée organization 
otherwise barred by law are permitted. (71) 
At the moment, persons employed in a managerial, supervisory, or 
confidential capacity are not covered by thèse provisions in any jurisdiction. 
Saskatchewan and Québec are the only jurisdictions in which ail pro-
fessional personnel are covered by labor législation. In ail other jurisdic-
tions certain groups of professionals are specifically excluded.(72) Teachers 
do not hâve the statutory right to bargain in New Brunswick, (73> Prince 
Edward Island, Newfoundland, and Ontario.(74) Most of the Acts also 
exclude certain other catégories of personnel such as domestic servants 
and those employed in agriculture. 
The research done for the Task Force does not offer any over-
whelming support for either including or excluding thèse catégories of 
personnel from the coverage of labour législation. Simmons found that 
in many areas of municipal government supervisory personnel belong to 
unions and participate in their activities, and he feels that this situation 
should be « corrected ».(73> 
Goldenberg notes that for professionals « the opposition to collective 
bargaining has been argued mainly in terms of status, professional ethics 
and public service, and the protection of the individualism traditionally 
associated with professional practice ».(76> But she goes on to point out that 
Proponents of collective ba rga in ing . . . maintain that changing social 
and économie conditions hâve overtaken and invalidated many of the 
traditional ideals and images. They contend that it is not collective 
bargaining, per se, but the impersonal employaient relationships in 
large scale bureaucratie enterprises that are eroding individual initiative 
and undermining the sensé of personal dignity and professional 
status. (77) 
C'1) Op.cit. 
(72) While the number of thèse excluded catégories varies between jurisdictions, 
there is a fairly consistent pattern of excluding the « traditional » and « closed » 
professional groups. See Goldenberg, op. cit. 
C73) This matter is under considération hère. 
(74) But this right has been granted voluntaritly in Ontario. 
(75) Op.cit. 
(76) Op.cit. (italics in the original). 
(77) Ibid. 
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She summarises the proponents' case in John Crispo's words : « They 
do not feel that they are treated as individuals so they don't react as 
individuals and they are beginning to think in terms of collective action».<78> 
She also cites Professor Cardin to the effect that a rigid définition of 
employée status under existing labour législation fails to take account 
of the particular nature of professional functions and results in an unduly 
high proportion of management exclusions from professional bargaining 
units.(79) Goldenberg herself cornes to the conclusion that « the variety 
of professional rôles, the degree of responsibility they entail, and the 
différent circumstances of employment in government, industry and other 
institutions makes it virtually impossible to establish an unequivocable 
standard of appropriate management exclusion ». <80> She also believes that 
collective bargaining is compatible with professional ethics. 
While some of the libéral professions hâve objected to collective 
bargaining on the grounds of its incompatibility with professional 
ethics, thèse same professions hâve set précédents of collective action 
to protect the income of their self-employed members. Any scale of 
tariff or fées agreed to by a professional group does precisely that. 
If members of a professional group can act in concert, as they do, 
to protect their income as self-employed persons, it seems illogical that 
employed members of the same profession should be denied similar 
rights to secure their income and working conditions. (81) 
Thus it would seem that at least by implication Goldenberg feels that 
professionals should be covered by the protective provisions of labour 
législation. 
The « great debate » over supervisory unionism is summarised by 
Rogow. <82> He demonstrates that the case against supervisory unionism 
can be reduced to two basic arguments — supervisory unionism is un-
necessary and that it has certain harmful effects such as restricting manage-
ments decision-making freedom, producing dissension and conflict which 
lead to a decrease in morale and to divided loyalties, and promoting 
practices which restrict productivity and encourage mediocrity. After 
reviewing the arguments of both sides as well as the work of various 
scholars such as Levinson and Ferguson, <8S> Rogow concludes that 
« évidence of harmful économie and social effects of supervisory unionism 
(78) Ibid. 
(79) Ibid. 
(80) Ibid. 
(81) Ibid. 
C82) Op.cit. 
(83) See n.49. 
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is scanty (although part of the explanation for this is neglect by 
researchers of this complex problem rather than conclusive research find-
ings proving the absence of adverse effects) ».(84) His study of supervisory 
unionism also leads him to conclude that 
Public policy in Nor th America is consistent — perhaps too consistent 
— in denying protection of the labor relations laws to the primari ly 
supervisory employée. The enormous range of variation by industry, 
by skill, and by location in the objective and subjective manager-
managed relationships suggests that the conflict-of-interest fears under-
lying the managerial exclusion législation cannot be assumed a priori. 
Only a case-by-case inquiry can détermine the probabilities hère. (ît5) 
Although the research done for the Task Force does not offer any 
clear-cut guidance on the subject, there would seem to be a strong case 
for everyone being covered by the protective provisions of labour légis-
lation. To begin with, much of the argumentation against unionism for 
certain groups of employées and for excluding them from the coverage 
of the législation is, as Rogow has noted, « conjectural, hypothetical, and 
extremely difficult conclusively to prove or disprove, especially before the 
fact ». <86> But the fact has already been established among most catégories 
of white-collar workers in Britain (and other European countries),(87) and 
the author's research for the Donovan Commission suggests that the 
« dire conséquences » which employers predict generally fail to ma-
térialise. <OT) Second, there are a number of précédents not only in Europe 
but also in Canada for covering some of thèse excluded groups by labour 
législation. AU professional employées enjoyed collective bargaining rights 
under P. C. 1003 between 1944 and 1948. <89> At the moment, ail pro-
fessional personnel in Saskatchewan and Québec as well as in the fédéral 
civil service hâve the statutory right to bargain. Third, Bairstow's research 
reveals that most of the union leaders she interviewed claimed that much 
of the delay in certification proceedings resulted from employer arguments 
(M) Op. cit. 
(85) Ibid. 
(86) Ibid. 
(87) In thèse countries, professional, managerial , confidential, and even industrial 
relations personnel ail engage in collective bargaining. In Sweden, even the clergy 
are unionised. 
(88) Tra(ie Union Growth and Récognition, op.cit., pp . 74-82. 
(89) But strong représentations from professional associations resulted in their 
exclusion from the existing législation which was passed in 1948. This change in 
policy would seem to be unjustified inasmuch as the législation would not hâve 
forced professionals to engage in collective bargaining, but only enabled them to do 
so if they so desired. 
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over who was properly classified as a supervisor or was employed in a 
confident! al capacity and therefore to be excluded from the bargaining 
unit. In one instance cited by a Montréal union leader, certification was 
delayed nearly a year in a large bank by an argument over 77 exclusions/90* 
Finally and most important, given the value of démocratie decision-
making and the desirability of making the process and structure of 
democracy as complète as possible, it follows that any group regardless 
of the functions it performs in the process of production shoultf be 
allowed to particïpate in the making and the administration of the rules 
by wnich it is governed on the lob. ' 
Public Policy and the Problems Arising From 
the Growth of White-Collar Unionism 
Assuming that Canadian industrial relations policy was amended 
along the lines suggested above resulting in a significant growth of white-
collar unionism, this would pose a number of issues upon which public 
policy might be expected to pronounce. Thèse include the nature of the 
bargaining unit, the nature of the bargaining agent, the content of collective 
bargaining, and the method of dispute seulement. 
THE NATURE OF THE BARGAINING UNIT 
The case which is made for excluding persons employed in a super-
visory, managerial, professional, or confidential capacity from the cover-
age of labour législation — the prévention of conflicts of interest — is not 
so much an argument for excluding them from ail bargaining units as 
it is for ensuring that they are not included in the same bargaining unit 
as other types of employées. Including supervisory and non-supervisory 
personnel in the same bargaining unit obviously could give rise to conflicts 
of interest, and is therefore undesirable. The answer is not to exclude 
supervisory and managerial personnel, whether professional or otherwise, 
from the coverage of the législation, but to ensure that it stipulâtes that 
any person who effectively supervises the work of another employée 
should not be included in the same bargaining unit as that employée. 
Such a provision would respect the hierarchical structure of authority 
in industry by ensuring that supervisors were not subject to a conflict 
of interest with respect to those they surpervise, while at the same time 
recognising the bargaining rights of ail employées. 
(90) Op. cit. 
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The Public Service Staff Relations Act recognises the logic of this 
principle by providing separate bargaining units for supervisory and non-
supervisory personnel in the same occupational category in the fédéral 
public service. But by excluding persons discharging significant managerial 
and confidential functions from ail bargaining units, it fails to carry this 
principle to its logical conclusion. The fact that a person performs 
significant managerial and confidential functions is a reason for ensuring 
that he is not included in the same bargaining unit as those who do not. 
But it is not a reason for excluding him from ail bargaining units. Many 
of those who perform significant managerial and confidential functions 
in the public service are not in a position to strike individual bargains 
with the Treasury Board. In spite of their functions, their terms and 
conditions of employment are determined by formai rules which apply 
impersonally to ail members of the group to which they belong. They are, 
therefore, just as likely to feel a need to belong to a union and engage 
in collective bargaining as those who do not perform such functions. 
The proper bargaining unit for professional workers is a particularly 
délicate issue. Should professional and non-professional workers be placed 
in separate bargaining units? Given that the interests of thèse two groups 
with respect to their duties and their terms and conditions of employment 
are sufficiently dissimilar to indicate an affirmative answer to this question, 
should there be one professional bargaining unit or one for each profession? 
It is doubtful if either of thèse questions can be answered unequivocably 
in labour législation. Goldenberg argues that the protection of craft and 
professional rights is 
to a large extent, a function of size. While there is undoubtedly a 
legitimate case for protecting the distinctive interests of organized 
professional groups where they are employed in significant numbers, 
care must be taken that this does resuit in an unmanageable prolifér-
ation of bargaining units. 
Rigidities in the law may be criticized — whether they restrict 
the bargaining unit to members of a single profession or whether they 
force professional workers — against their will — into multi-profes-
sional or ail inclusive units. (91) 
A flexible system of determining professional bargaining units is required. 
This could be achieved by stipulating in the législation that professional 
workers may décide, subject to the approval of the Board, the type of 
bargaining unit, if any, they wish to be included in. Such a provision was 
inserted in the Saskatchewan Trade Union Act in 1966.(92) 
(91) Op.cit. 
(92) See ibid. 
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THE NATURE OF THE BARGAINING AGENT 
It is commonly argued that just as supervisors should not be included 
in the samë bargaining unit as those they supervise, so they should not 
be members of the same union as those they supervise. Several reasons 
are advanced in support of this position. If supervisor and supervisée 
are members of the same union and one has a grievance against the 
other, it will be most difficult, if not impossible, for the union to represent 
them both effectively. It is also possible that the supervisory members 
may control the union, or at least certain locals, and subordinate rank-
and-file interests to their own. Even more likely, control will be in the 
hands of the rank-and-file, and action taken by supervisors in the course 
of their duty will be called into question by the union. It is not difficult 
to find examples of foremen being disciplined by the rank-and-file for 
« conduct detrimental to the union ».(93) Most of the opposition to super-
visors being members of rank-and-file unions dérives from this difficulty. 
Having supervisor and supervisée in the same union obviously créâtes 
difficulties. Sweden has tried to eliminate thèse by including in its labour 
législation a provision which permits employers to require their foremen 
to refrain from membership in rank-and-file unions. (94> Leaving aside the 
question of whether it is désirable for the state and the employer to inter-
fère in this way with the employées' right to join unions of their own 
choosing, it is very doubtful if such a solution would be désirable in 
Canada. Employées often wish to retain their membership in a union 
when they are promoted to supervisory positions in order to maintain 
their right to accumulated benefits and in case they are demoted to the 
tools, and they might be placed at a serious disadvantage if they were no 
longer able to do this. In addition, there are certain areas — for example, 
printing, construction, and railways — where the practice of supervisors 
being members of rank-and-file unions has a long history, and any change 
would upset well-established and generally accepted bargaining relation-
ships. 
But this does not mean that the problem has no solution. Législation 
could stipulate that before a rank-and-file union could be certified on 
behalf of supervisors it must form separate locals for them and ensure that 
(93) Rogow, op. cit., cites examples in the United States and Canada, and examples 
could also be given for Britain and other countries. 
(94) See Nilstein, op. cit., pp. 279-280. But unlike North America, public policy in 
Sweden does give protection and encouragement to the foremen-only union. 
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thèse are not subject to rank-and-file control. (95> In addition, it could be 
made an unfair labour practice for a rank-and-file union to discipline a 
supervisory member for carrying out any duties which an employer may 
assign him. 
A union which is affiliated to the wider labour movement is often 
not considered to be an appropriate bargaining agent for certain catégories 
of white-collar personnel. Goldenberg asks whether there is any incom-
patibility in supervisory and non-supervisory unions being affiliated to the 
same central labour organisation ? She feels that « at présent the question 
is an académie one, but its implications merit considération ». (96> Alberta, 
Manitoba, Ontario, and Québec prohibit municipal police from becoming 
members of an association which is a branch or local of, or is affiliated 
with, any provincial, national or international trade union or association 
of trade unions. Simmons feels that other provinces should include such 
a provision in their labour législation to eliminate the possibility of conflict-
ing loyalties in the police's responsibility to the public. (97> 
Inasmuch as the police are expected to maintain law and order 
during industrial disputes, there is obviously a risk of conflict of interest 
if they are in the same union as other employées. Simmons' recommen-
dation that policemen should not be allowed to join unions which hâve 
members employed outside the police service would therefore seem reason-
able. But it is difficult to see what conflicts of interest arise in having 
unions of policemen or supervisors affiliated to trades and labour councils, 
provincial fédérations of labour, or the Canadian Labour Congress. Thèse 
central labour organisations hâve no power to interfère in the internai 
affairs of their affiliâtes. Their major function is to represent the interests 
of employées within the community. Consultation by governments with 
« labour » in Canada means consultation with thèse central labour organi-
sations. If unions of supervisors and policemen wish to participate in 
this process, there seems no good reason why they should not be allowed 
to do so. In fact, as was argued at the beginning of this paper, it is most 
désirable that they should participate. 
The choice of a bargaining agent for professional workers présents 
a spécial problem. Goldenberg argues that professional associations with 
licensing authority should be precluded from acting as bargaining agents 
(95) This is sometimes achieved in Britain by making supervisory locals or branches 
responsible directly to the union's national executive. 
(96) Op. cit. 
(97) Op. cit. But he notes that affiliation with other trade unions has been the gênerai 
practice among firemen and recommends that this should not be prohibited. 
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on the grounds that 
it would be undesirable to combine in one body the public interest 
function of licensing with the private interest function of bargaining. 
The possibility, however remote, of restricting numbers to improve 
self-interest is too great a public risk. (98) 
She feels that this problem could be resolved if labour législation required 
professional associations to restrict themselves to professional matters and 
a separate organisation to be established for collective bargaining purposes. 
This is, in effect, the System in Québec. 
While it may be undesirable for professionals to be able to improve 
their position both by restricting supply and by collective bargaining, it 
is most doubtful if this should or could be rectified in the manner suggest-
ed by Goldenberg. To some extent, such législation would discriminate 
against professional workers, for their position in this regard is not 
altogether unique. Many craftsmen are also able effectively to control 
labour supply by means of apprenticeship régulations, union security 
arrangements, or other devices, while at the same time engaging in collect-
ive bargaining. Moreover, as Goldenberg herself points out, « In some 
provinces . . . historical practice has entrenched the position of certain 
professional associations (notably nurses and teachers) as bargaining 
agents and any change at this time would . . . upset a well established and 
generally accepted pattern of bargaining relationships ».(99) Most import-
ant, the fact that the public interest function of licensing is lodged in one 
body and the private interest function of bargaining in another is no 
guarantee that they will not collude and that, in practice, the two functions 
will be kept separate. 
In any case, it is difficult to see why the danger of a professional 
association restricting supply in the self-interest of its members should 
only arise when it engages in collective bargaining. There can be little 
doubt that most professional associations already restrict supply in their 
members' self-interest regardless of whether they also engage in collective 
bargaining. If this is considered to be a problem, it will not be solved by 
(98) Op. cit. She also objects to the professional association being the bargaining 
agent on the grounds that supervisory and non-supervisory personnel would be 
members of the same organisation and therefore subject to a conflict of interest. 
This point has already been dealt with above. John Crispo (éd.), Collective Bargaining 
and the Professional Employée (Toronto : University of Toronto, Centre for 
Industrial Relations, 1966), p. 120, also argues that the licensing and bargaining 
functions should be kept seperate. 
(") Op. cit. 
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prohibiting professional associations from engaging in collective bargain-
ing. There is only one way to solve this problem and that is to put the 
« public interest » function of licensing in the hands of a public rather 
than a private organisation. 
THE CONTENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Some of the Task Force's researchers hâve commented on the content 
of collective bargaining for white-collar workers. Simmons feels that 
« management rights » should be protected by law and recommends that 
collective bargaining for police, firemen, and other municipal employées 
should exclude matters concerned with probationary requirements, examin-
ations, appointments, promotions, or dismissals as well as any matters 
which would require législative action for its implementation.(100) Gol-
denberg argues that there is a conflict between « professional prérogatives » 
and « management rights », but she does not go so far as to suggest that 
it should be regulated by law. <101> 
Such statements, particularly those by Simmons, imply that employer-
managers hâve certain exclusive rights or prérogatives. But Chamberlain 
has very clearly and forcefully shown that they do not. There is not room 
lière to give the détails of his analysis, but it demonstrates that 
I there is no barrier except relative bargaining powers to the scope 
of the subject matter in which the union may interest itself. It can 
seek to bargain on any matter which is of sufficient importance to its 
membership to permit it to array a bargaining power adéquate to the 
/ objective. (in2) 
Nor should such a barrier be erected by the law. If employées feel that 
their interests can be profoundly affected by décisions on such matters 
as examinations, promotions, and dismissals, then there seems to be no 
valid reason why the law should prohibit their union from trying to 
participate in the making of such décisions. In fact, given the value of 
démocratie decision-making, there is every reason why the law should not 
prohibit this. 
Goldenberg also claims that there is a problem of recognising 
individual merit for professional workers, and notes that the Draft Profes-
sional Negotiations Act of the Ontario Steering Committee seeks to 
(îoo) Qp
 cjt jhg pu5]jc Service Staff Relations Act contains a similar provision. 
(10t) Op. cit. 
(I02) See Neil W. Chamberlain, « Union Impact on the Management Function », 
Labor (New York : McGraw-Hill, 1958), chap. 12. The quotation is taken from 
pp. 231-232. 
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obviate this problem by providing for the negotiation of individual con-
tracts within the framework of a basic collective agreement.(103) If profes-
sional workers are as concerned with the récognition of individual merit 
as Goldenberg implies, then it is highly probable that in their own self-
interest they will ensure that their associations or unions negotiate collect-
ive agreements which will allow individual merit to be recognised. There 
in some évidence in Goldenberg's paper (104> that those professionals who 
already engage in collective bargaining hâve done just this. There seems 
little justification or need for the law to interfère hère. 
THE METHOD OF DISPUTE SEULEMENT 
The method of dispute settlement which white-collar workers use or 
should use has also received some attention from many of the scholars 
the Task Force commissioned to do research on white-collar unionism. 
Most of Simmons' recommendations are concerned with the method of 
dispute settlement which municipal employées should be made to use. In 
short, he feels that strikes for such employées should be outlawed, and 
ail disputes should be submitted to compulsory binding arbitration. <105> 
Goldenberg feels that 
Because the potential impact of a withdrawal of services varies both 
between and within professional groups, the question of professional 
responsibility in re dispute settlement — and of public intervention 
when negotiations reach an impasse — must be related to the public 
interest aspect of a given professional function. While recognising the 
right to strike as an essential ingrédient of the bargaining process, 
some restrictions are indicated — by private restraint or public inter-
vention — where a vital public interest is involved. Assuming that a 
work stoppage by a professional group would be contrary to the public 
interest, the moral or ethical question, as Prof essor Carrothers has 
observed, is « not whether collective bargaining as such is improper 
but whether a reasonable substitute can be devised for the sanction 
of the right to strike". 
Where, on the other hand, the withdrawal of professional services 
would not jeopardize a vital public interest, no légal or moral restric-
tion on the right to strike is indicated. (106) 
Muir argues that teachers should be allowed to strike, and recommends a 
procédure which he feels would protect the pupil's right to an éducation, 
while at the same time respecting the teacher's right to strike. (107> 
(1 0 3) Op. cit. 
(104) Op. cit. 
<105) Op. cit. 
(io6) Qp cit (itaiics in the original). 
(107) Op. cit. 
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There is no valid reason why the law should treat white-collar work-
ers any differently from manual workers with respect to the method of 
dispute seulement. Whether the workers are white-collar or manual is 
irrelevant. The important considération is whether their work affects a 
vital public interest. If it does, then there may be a case for legislating 
a spécial method of dispute settlement for such workers. But this is a 
subject which is far too complex to be examined within the scope of this 
paper. In any case, this has already been done for the Task Force by 
Professor Arthurs. (108> What Muir, Simmons, and Goldenberg hâve to 
say regarding methods of dispute settlement for various catégories of 
white-collar workers could be better considered in relation to Arthurs' 
paper on dispute settlement than in relation to this paper on white-collar 
unionism. 
Conclusions 
This paper has shown the rôle which public policy might and, in the 
opinion of the author, should play in encouraging the growth of white-
collar unionism and in dealing with the problems arising therefrom. The 
final question to be considered is whether this policy should be expressed 
in a single pièce of législation or several. 
Simmons has recommended that policemen and firemen should 
each hâve their own collective bargaining législation in every province.(109) 
He justifies this recommendation on the grounds that it would ensure 
that policemen and firemen would not be subject to conflicts of interest 
with other employées, they would be treated consistently throughout each 
province, their morale would be improved, and they would not be so 
likely to claim the right to strike which other employées enjoy. This case 
for separate législation is very weak. It is difficult to see how conflicts of 
interest between policemen and firemen and other employées can arise 
simply because the collective bargaining provisions for ail employées are 
contained in a single pièce of législation. Consistency of treatment through-
out a province would also be guaranteed if the collective bargaining pro-
visions for policemen and firemen were contained in gênerai labour légis-
lation. It is highly doubtful that the morale of policemen and firemen 
would be significantly improved simply because they had their own légis-
lation. If Professor Arthurs' essential industry dispute scheme were 
(108) See the Report of Task Force Project No. 31. 
(109) But he suggest that gênerai municipal employées should be covered by the existing 
Labour Relations Acts. 
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adopted, presumably other groups of employées besides policemen and 
firemen would hâve certain restrictions placed on their right to strike. (110> 
Some professional groups would like to hâve collective bargaining 
provisions written into their own professional Acts, while others would 
like to hâve a single professional negotiation Act covering ail professional 
workers. <m> Goldenberg doubts if either of thèse alternatives can be 
justified. 
It remains questionable... whether professional workers constitute 
such a distinctive entity, with such divergent needs from the rest of the 
labour force, as to require a separate collective bargaining statute. 
General labour législation, incorporating some spécial provisions for 
professional workers (including the right to opt out of collective 
bargaining, or to do so as a separate group) may be sufficient. (112) 
This is already the situation in Saskatchewan.(113) 
In the author's view statutory collective bargaining provisions for 
ail employées should be contained in a single pièce of législation. This 
would prevent governments being exposed to a form of whipsawing as 
each group with separate législation vied for a more favourable statutory 
position. It would also make it easier to présent an integrated collective 
bargaining policy with clearly stated objectives. In addition, it would 
prevent the idea developing that certain groups such as professional 
workers hâve a higher or at least spécial status in the eyes of the law. But 
it is not really crucial whether there is one pièce of législation or several. 
(u0) Simmons also claims that because police unions would not hâve the right to 
affiliate to the wider labour movement, jurisdictional disputes would not occur, and 
therefore certification of police unions to ensure the right to exclusive représentation 
is not required. But it does not follow that because police unions are unaffiliated, 
jurisdictional disputes could not arise. Two unaffiliated unions might both claim 
jurisdiction over the same police force or a breakaway organisation might claim 
jurisdiction from the incumbent union. It would therefore be advisable for police 
unions, like other unions, to be certified, and this is an additional reason for having 
them covered by gênerai labour législation and the various Labour Relations Boards. 
(m) See Goldenberg, op. cit. 
<112) Ibid. 
(n3) Goldenberg ibid., does feel, however, that there is a case for ensuring spécial 
professional représentation on Labour Relations Boards. But it is debatable whether 
there should be any « committed » représentatives on Boards. In addition, spécial 
professional représentation could give rise to spécial pleading by other groups of 
employées. For example, does a craft unit require a craftsman on the Board to define 
it ? In any case, since the Chairmen of Labour Relations Boards are generally 
lawyers, in a sensé professional workers are already represented. 
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What is crucial is that thereshould be législation which would enable 
arrjTgrbup of ~lmployeesin society to engage in collective bargàïnîng if 
it so desired. " " ~" ^ 
LA CROISSANCE DU SYNDICALISME CHEZ LES COLS BLANCS 
ET LA POLITIQUE GOUVERNEMENTALE CANADIENNE 
INTRODUCTION 
Cet article est une version revisée d'une étude faite pour l'Équipe spécialisée 
en relations du travail afin de l'aider dans ses recommandations concernant le 
syndicalisme chez les cols-blancs au Canada. Il est évident qu'il n'engage que la 
responsabilité de son auteur et non de l'Équipe spécialisée Nous ne considérons ce-
pendant que les aspects du problème auxquels les politiques gouvernementales sem-
blent les plus applicables, à savoir la croissance du syndicalisme chez les cols-blancs 
ainsi que les problèmes qu'elle crée. 
Les syndicats sont nécessaires pour que les travailleurs aient voix au chapitre 
des décisions qui les affectent tant à l'intérieur de l'entreprise qu'au sein de la 
société globale. À supposer que la prise de décision démocratique soit une bonne 
chose, il s'ensuit que l'absence de syndicalisation chez les cols blancs et les cols 
bleus est un sujet qui prête à sérieuse réflexion. Tant et aussi longtemps que des 
groupes d'employés ne sont pas représentés dans la prise de décision, le processus 
et la structure démocratiques ne sont pas achevés. Il est alors logique de se 
demander comment aider à la croissance du syndicalisme dans ce secteur. Avant 
de tenter d'élaborer une réponse à cette question, il est nécessaire d'isoler les 
facteurs principaux favorisant ou retardant la croissance du syndicalisme? chez les 
cols blancs. 
LES CAUSES DE LA CROISSANCE DU SYNDICALISME CHEZ LES COLS BLANCS 
Il y a plusieurs causes à la croissance du syndicalisme chez les cols blancs : 
a) certaines caractéristiques socio-démographiques des cols blancs, comme le sexe, 
l'origine sociale, l'âge et le statut dans la communauté ; b) certains iispects de 
leur situation économique comme le salaire, les avantages sociaux et la sécurité 
d'emploi ; c) certaines caractéristiques de leur occupation comme le degré de 
concentration de l'emploi par groupes, les chances de promotion, le degré de méca-
nisation et d'automation ainsi que le degré de proximité des travailleurs manuels 
syndiqués ; d) quelques caractéristiques du syndicalisme telles l'image qu'en a 
le public, leurs politiques de recrutement et leurs structures ; e) le degré auquel 
les employeurs sont prêts à reconnaître les syndicats de cols blancs ; f ) la mesure 
dans laquelle l'action gouvernementale favorise la reconnaissance syndicale. 
Il est cependant impossible d'étudier ici les rapports qui existent entre chacun 
de ces facteurs et la croissance du syndicalisme chez les cols blancs. La recherche 
et l'expérience de plusieurs pays démontrent que trois des six causes ci-haut men-
tionnées sont d'une extrême importance dans le problème qui nous préoccupe. 
Ce sont : le degré auquel l'emploi de cols blancs est concentré dans de grands 
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groupes, la mesure dans laquelle les employeurs sont prêts à reconnaître les syndi-
cats de cols blancs et la portée de l'action gouvernementale favorisant la reconnais-
sance syndicale. 
Plus le degré de concentration de l'emploi est grand, plus grande est la possibilité 
de syndicalisation chez les cols blancs. Il semble que nous puissions expliquer 
cette affirmation en disant que plus les employés réalisent leur besoin pour le 
syndicalisme et plus les syndicats sont intéressés à les recruter, plus leur emploi 
est concentré. Mais il se peut que ce besoin particulier ne soit pas rencontré soit 
parce que les employeurs refusent de reconnaître les syndicats, soit parce qu'ils 
établissent des politiques destinées à décourager ou à défendre à leurs cols blancs 
d'adhérer à ces associations. Généralement, les syndicats, surtout en Amérique 
du Nord, n'ont jamais été capables de forcer les employeurs à les reconnaître. 
Ceci a donc exigé l'introduction de politiques gouvernementales facilitant le 
travail des syndicats et rendant la résistance des employeurs plus difficile. 
L'ENCOURAGEMENT DU SYNDICALISME CHEZ LES COLS BLANCS 
PAR LES POLITIQUES GOUVERNEMENTALES 
Ce qui précède démontre que même si la concentration de l'emploi crée un 
besoin pour le syndicalisme chez les cols blancs, il est improbable qu'il croisse à 
moins que l'opposition patronale soit maîtrisée par les politiques gouvernementales. 
Nous avouerons néanmoins que même si les politiques gouvernementales cana-
diennes prétendent annuler cette opposition patronale, elles sont loin d'être efficaces. 
Il y a sûrement plusieurs façons de rendre plus efficaces les politiques cana-
diennes sur ce point. 
1.— les politiques gouvernementales en matière de relations industrielles 
pourraient contenir une déclaration quant à la valeur du syndicalisme 
et de la négociation collective et quant au désir d'encourager la crois-
sance de ces institutions. 
2 .— au lieu d'exiger d'un syndicat de prouver qu'il représente la majorité 
des salariés employés dans une unité de négociation, on pourrait de-
mander qu'il ait la majorité parmi les voteurs. 
3. — on pourrait introduire une procédure de vote rapide : ce moyen per-
mettrait au syndicat de prendre un vote de représentation rapide à 
chaque requête en accréditation. Ce vote pourrait permettre au syndicat 
de pouvoir compter, à la suite d'un rapide tour d'horizon, sur, par 
exemple, trente pourcent des travailleurs composant l'unité de négo-
ciation. 
4. — on pourrait accélérer le processus de reconnaissance en rendant la 
législation existante beaucoup moins technique et légale. Au lieu d'exi-
ger, par exemple, que le syndicat prouve que la majorité des travailleurs 
dans l'unité de négociation soit des membres en règle de l'union (défi-
nissant « membres en règle » d'une manière extrêmement technique et 
légale), les désirs des employés pourraient être plus facilement et plus 
justement déterminés en demandant simplement qu'ils fassent parvenir 
à la C.R.T. une pétition désignant le syndicat par lequel ils veulent 
se faire représenter. 
276 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 24, NO 2 
5.— le syndicat devrait avoir autant de chances de communiquer avec les 
employés que peut en avoir la direction de l'entreprise. Si un employeur 
s'adresse à ses employés au sujet de la syndicalisation sur les heures 
et lieux du travail, on pourrait exiger que les syndicats aient les mêmes 
facilités. Ou encore si la partie patronale communique avec les employés 
par la poste, on pourrait exiger que le syndicat ait accès à la liste 
d'adresse. 
6.— on devrait enlever le droit à l'employeur de se présenter devant la 
Commission dans le but de s'opposer à une requête en accréditation ou 
d'appuyer une demande de révocation d'accréditation syndicale. 
7. — le fardeau de la preuve dans les cas de pratiques déloyales devrait 
incomber à l'employeur. 
8.— on pourrait réduire l'étendue des pratiques déloyales patronales en 
défendant tout changement unilatéral dans les salaires et les conditions 
de travail et en plaçant un moratorium sur tout congédiement à partir 
du moment où les employés ont envoyé une pétitition à la Commission 
pour la tenue d'une élection jusqu'au moment où cette dernière a lieu. 
9. — là où ce n'est pas déjà le cas, la Commission, plutôt que les cours 
ordinaires, devrait avoir l'autorité de poursuivre dans les cas de pra-
tiques déloyales sans l'approbation préalable du ministre du travail. 
10. — si la Commission trouve un employeur coupable de pratiques déloyales, 
une des sanctions pourrait être l'accréditation automatique du syndicat. 
11 .— on pourrait forcer l'employeur à négocier de bonne foi en prohibant 
tout changement unilatéral des salaires et des conditions de travail après 
que le syndicat eut été accrédité. En plus, on pourrait permettre aux 
deux parties de demander l'aide d'un arbitre indépendant dont la déci-
sion lierait les parties, et ce durant la période de non-maturité des 
négociations, i.e. trois à cinq ans suivant l'accréditation. 
12. — un dernier moyen par lequel les politiques gouvernementales pourraient 
encourager la croissance du syndicalisme serait de s'assurer que tous — 
incluant ceux détenant des postes de direction, de supervision, profes-
sionnels ou confidentiels — sont couverts par les clauses de protection 
qu'elles émettent. 
LES PROBLÈMES CRÉÉS PAR LA CROISSANCE DU SYNDICALISME CHEZ 
LES COLS BLANCS ET LES POLITIQUES GOUVERNEMENTALES 
En faisant l'hypothèse que la politique canadienne de relations industrielles 
ait été amendée suivant les suggestions ci-haut mentionnées et qu'il en ait résulté 
une croissance significative du syndicalisme chez les cols blancs, il s'en suivrait 
une série d'implications sujettes à une prise de position de la part des politiques 
gouvernementales. Parmi ces implications, notons la nature de l'unité; de négo-
ciation, la nature de l'agent de négociation, le contenu de la négociation collective 
et la méthode de règlement des conflits. 
LA NATURE DE L'UNITÉ DE NEGOCIATION 
Le fait d'exclure des personnes employées à des postes de direction, de super-
vision, à caractère professionnel ou confidentiel de la partie des lois du travail — 
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la prévention des conflits d'intérêts — n'a pas tellement pour but de les exclure 
de toute unité de négociation, mais plutôt de s'assurer qu'elles ne font pas partie 
des mêmes unités de négociation que les autres employés. Le fait d'inclure dans la 
même unité de négociation du personnel de cadre et des employés ordinaires 
peut créer de sérieux conflits d'intérêt, ce qui n'est pas à désirer. 
La réponse n'est pas d'exclure le personnel de cadre, professionnel ou non, 
de la portée de la législation, mais de stipuler que toute personne qui dirige effec-
tivement le travail d'un autre employé ne soit pas incluse dans la même unité de 
négociation que cet employé. 
L'unité de négociation propre aux travailleurs professionnels est un point 
particulièrement délicat. Mais il semble être temps qu'on exige une façon flexible 
de déterminer des unités professionnelles de négociation. Ceci peut être fait en 
stipulant que les travailleurs professionnels peuvent décider, s'il y a lieu, du type 
d'unité de négociation dans laquelle ils veulent être inclus : leur décision serait 
sujette à approbation par la Commission. 
LA NATURE DE L'AGENT DE NÉGOCIATION 
Le fait d'avoir des superviseurs et des « supervisés » dans le même syndicat 
crée des difficultés qui peuvent être surmontées si la législation stipule que pour 
qu'un syndicat de travailleurs puisse être accrédité comme représentant de cadres, 
il doit former des locaux séparés et s'assurer que ces derniers ne seront pas sous 
le contrôle des travailleurs du rang. En plus, on pourrait traduire en pratiques 
déloyales le fait qu'un syndicat de travailleurs applique une sanction à un cadre 
pour avoir fait une tâche que l'employeur aurait pu exiger de lui. 
Un syndicat local affilié à une centrale plus vaste n'est souvent pas considéré 
comme agent de négociation approprié pour des catégories de cols blancs tels les 
surintendants et les policiers. Mais il est difficile de voir quels conflits d'intérêt pour-
raient naître de l'affiliation de syndicats de cadres ou de policiers à des con-
seils de travail ou de métiers, à des fédérations provinciales ou au Congrès du 
travail du Canada. Ces organismes centraux n'ont aucun pouvoir d'ingérence dans 
les affaires internes de leurs affiliés. Leur fonction principale est de représenter 
les intérêts des employés à l'intérieur de la communauté. La consultation du monde 
du travail par les gouvernements au Canada signifie la consultation de ces centrales 
syndicales. Si les syndicats de cadres ou de policiers veulent participer à ce 
processus, il semble qu'il n'y ait aucune bonne raison les en empêchant. En fait, il 
est désirable qu'il le fasse en vertu des valeurs de la prise de décision de façon 
démocratique. 
Le choix d'un agent de négociation pour les travailleurs professionnels pose un 
problème spécial. Quelques auteurs ont prétendu que les associations professionnelles 
détenant une autorité quant aux permis de travail à accorder ne devraient pas agir 
comme agents de négociation parce que : 
« It would be undesirable to combine in one body the public interest 
function of licensing with the private interest function of bargaining. 
The possibility, however remote, of restricting numbers to improve self-
interest is too great a public risk ». 
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Mais il est difficile de voir pourquoi le danger pour une association profes-
sionnelle de restreindre l'offre dans l'intérêt de ses membres ne serait soulevé qu'au 
moment de la négociation collective. Il y a peu de doute que la plupart des asso-
ciations professionnelles restreignent déjà l'offre dans l'intérêt de leurs membres indé-
pendamment du fait qu'ils s'engagent dans la négociation collective. Si ceci est 
considéré comme un problème, on ne le réglera pas en défendant l'accès des asso-
ciations professionnelles à la négociation collective. Il n'y a qu'un moyen de régler 
ce problème : il appartient à une organisation publique d'émettre des permis de 
pratique et non à une organisation privée. 
LE CONTENU DE LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
Certains auteurs ont prétendu que la loi devrait protéger les droits de gérance 
en excluant certaines choses de la négociation collective. De tels arguments se 
basent sur le fait que les cadres ont certains droits exclusifs et prérogatives, mais 
Chamberlain a démontré avec clarté et vigueur qu'il n'en était pas ainsi. Il semble-
rait alors qu'il n'y ait pas de raisons valables pour lesquelles la loi empêcherait les 
syndicats d'essayer de participer à la prise de décision sur des points tels les pro-
motions et les mises-à-pied. En fait, suivant les valeurs de la prise de décision démo-
cratique, il n'y a pas de raison pour laquelle la loi devrait prohiber de telles choses. 
LA MÉTHODE DE RÈGLEMENT DES CONFLITS 
Il n'y a aucune raison valable pour laquelle le législateur traiterait les cols blancs 
différemment des travailleurs manuels en ce qui a trait à la méthode de règlement 
des conflits. Le fait que les travailleurs soient cols blancs ou cols bleus n'est pas 
pertinent. L'aspect important est à savoir si leur travail affecte un intérêt public 
vital. Si oui, il peut y avoir raison d'établir, par voie de législation, une méthode 
spéciale de règlement des conflits pour de tels travailleurs. 
CONCLUSION 
Nous croyons que le droit à la négociation collective pour tous les employés 
devrait être consacré dans une seule loi. Ceci éviterait aux gouvernements d'être 
exposés à une sorte de « maquignonnage » alors que chacun des groupes régi par une 
législation propre rivalise pour une position légale plus favorable. Cela rendrait égale-
ment plus facile la présentation d'une politique intégrée de négociation collective avec 
des buts clairement cités. En plus, l'idée que certains se font quant au statut spécial 
ou plus grand des travailleurs professionnels aux yeux de la loi pourrait être dissipée. 
Mais en fait, ce n'est pas un point crucial qu'il y ait une ou plusieurs lois. Ce qui 
est crucial, c'est qu'il devrait y avoir une législation permettant à tout groupe 
d'employés dans la société de s'engager dans le processus de la négociation collec-
tive s'il le désire. 
